As Timothy Geithner pushes for an overhaul, it's time to rehabilitate one of the tools that got us into this mess: the credit-default swap.

By Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales

Just days after announcing his plan to clean up banks' balance sheets of toxic assets, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner hit the airwaves, priming audiences for his next big project: a regulatory system to ensure that this financial crisis is a one-time event. "[The] core thing is to make sure that the institutions at the center of our financial system are subject to much more conservative, much tougher requirements on capital and leverage," he told NBC's David Gregory on Sunday's Meet the Press. Geithner will be taking his show on the road this week as the G20 convenes in London, where regulation will be high on the agenda.

Should we welcome Geithner's regulatory rethink? In principle, yes. If there is one lesson to be learned from the 2008 financial crisis, it is that large financial institutions (LFIs) such as Citigroup or AIG are too big to fail. Whether this doctrine is based on economics -- the cost of LFI failure is too high -- or politics  -- the pressure to save LFIs is too strong -- the conclusion is the same: We need to reimagine how we regulate these institutions.

We'll explain why a market-based system is the best way to achieve this, and how credit default swaps -- yes, the same financial tools that helped get us into this mess -- can play a role. But first, some basic principles.

So what's wrong with bankruptcy for financial giants? In a free-market economy, bankruptcy accomplishes two crucial goals: it resolves conflicting claims and it shifts control away from incumbent management. By penalizing owners and managers, bankruptcy gives firms an incentive to repay their debts, thus permitting them to raise capital in the first place. But for LFIs, bankruptcy is a dangerous option. Given their size and the dense web of derivative and short-term financing contracts that these institutions have, bankruptcy spreads uncertainty throughout the economy, as we saw in the case of Lehman Brothers. So, we want a system that achieves the goals of bankruptcy, but at the same time ensures that these other contracts are safe.

How do we thread this needle? Here, we can learn from a common market practice: margin accounts. In a margin account, an investor buys stock and puts down only part of the cost. When the stock price drops, the broker who extended a loan for the rest of the stock price asks the investor to post new collateral. The investor then has a choice: He can post the collateral, thereby re-establishing the safety of his position, or he can liquidate his holding, allowing the broker to be paid in full.    

This analogy can help us figure out how much capital large financial institutions should be required to keep on hand. The answer: an LFI will have to post enough collateral (equity) to insure that its liabilities are always paid in full. When the fluctuation in the value of the underlying assets puts creditors at risk, the LFI's equity holders will be faced with a margin call: They will either have to inject new capital or lose their equity. In both cases the creditors will be protected.

The main difference between margin calls and our new capital requirement system is the trigger mechanism. In a margin account, the broker looks at the value of the investments (which is easily determined since all assets are traded) and compares the value of the collateral posted with the possible losses the position might have in the following days. Creditors of LFIs, however, are often dispersed and so unable to coordinate to make a margin call. And since most LFI assets, such as commercial loans and home equity lines, are non-standardized and not frequently traded, their value is hard to assess. Another mechanism will be needed to determine when the margin is too thin.

One possibility is to leave the decision of when to make a margin call in the hands of a regulator. However, the risk here is twofold. Either the regulator is powerful, leaving financial institutions exposed to the risk of abuse, or the regulator is weak and will be unduly influenced by failing institutions and intervene too late.

Regulators should therefore rely on a market-based trigger: a credit default swap (CDS). Despite being viewed by many as a "financial weapon of mass destruction," CDSs are like any tool that can be used wisely or foolishly. In this context, they are potentially some of the best regulatory instruments available. A credit default swap on an LFI is an insurance claim that pays off if that institution fails and creditors are not paid in full. Since the CDS is a "bet" on the institution's strength (or weakness), its price reflects the probability that the LFI debt will not be repaid. Such CDSs, in essence, indicate the risk that a large financial institution will fail.

In our mechanism, when the CDS price rises above a critical value (indicating that the institution has reached an unacceptable threshold of weakness), the regulator would force the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price and risk of failure back down. If the LFI fails to do this within a predetermined period of time, the regulator will take over.

This regulatory takeover would not be dissimilar to a milder form of bankruptcy, and it achieves all the other goals of bankruptcy -- discipline on management and shareholders -- without imposing any of the systemic costs.

Credit-default swaps have been demonized as one of the main causes of the current crisis. It would be only fitting if they were part of the solution.

Oliver Hart is professor of economics at Harvard University. Luigi Zingales is professor of finance at University of Chicago, Booth School of Business.

Source: http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/30/to_regulate_finance_try_the_market

Thirty-plus years ago, when I was a graduate student in economics, only the least ambitious of my classmates sought careers in the financial world. Even then, investment banks paid more than teaching or public service — but not that much more, and anyway, everyone knew that banking was, well, boring.

In the years that followed, of course, banking became anything but boring. Wheeling and dealing flourished, and pay scales in finance shot up, drawing in many of the nation’s best and brightest young people (O.K., I’m not so sure about the “best” part). And we were assured that our supersized financial sector was the key to prosperity.

Instead, however, finance turned into the monster that ate the world economy.

Recently, the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef circulated a paper that could have been titled “The Rise and Fall of Boring Banking” (it’s actually titled “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry, 1909-2006”). They show that banking in America has gone through three eras over the past century.

Before 1930, banking was an exciting industry featuring a number of larger-than-life figures, who built giant financial empires (some of which later turned out to have been based on fraud). This highflying finance sector presided over a rapid increase in debt: Household debt as a percentage of G.D.P. almost doubled between World War I and 1929.

During this first era of high finance, bankers were, on average, paid much more than their counterparts in other industries. But finance lost its glamour when the banking system collapsed during the Great Depression.

The banking industry that emerged from that collapse was tightly regulated, far less colorful than it had been before the Depression, and far less lucrative for those who ran it. Banking became boring, partly because bankers were so conservative about lending: Household debt, which had fallen sharply as a percentage of G.D.P. during the Depression and World War II, stayed far below pre-1930s levels.

Strange to say, this era of boring banking was also an era of spectacular economic progress for most Americans.

After 1980, however, as the political winds shifted, many of the regulations on banks were lifted — and banking became exciting again. Debt began rising rapidly, eventually reaching just about the same level relative to G.D.P. as in 1929. And the financial industry exploded in size. By the middle of this decade, it accounted for a third of corporate profits.

As these changes took place, finance again became a high-paying career — spectacularly high-paying for those who built new financial empires. Indeed, soaring incomes in finance played a large role in creating America’s second Gilded Age.

Needless to say, the new superstars believed that they had earned their wealth. “I think that the results our company had, which is where the great majority of my wealth came from, justified what I got,” said Sanford Weill in 2007, a year after he had retired from Citigroup. And many economists agreed.

Only a few people warned that this supercharged financial system might come to a bad end. Perhaps the most notable Cassandra was Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, who argued at a 2005 conference that the rapid growth of finance had increased the risk of a “catastrophic meltdown.” But other participants in the conference, including Lawrence Summers, now the head of the National Economic Council, ridiculed Mr. Rajan’s concerns.

And the meltdown came.

Much of the seeming success of the financial industry has now been revealed as an illusion. (Citigroup stock has lost more than 90 percent of its value since Mr. Weill congratulated himself.) Worse yet, the collapse of the financial house of cards has wreaked havoc with the rest of the economy, with world trade and industrial output actually falling faster than they did in the Great Depression. And the catastrophe has led to calls for much more regulation of the financial industry.

But my sense is that policy makers are still thinking mainly about rearranging the boxes on the bank supervisory organization chart. They’re not at all ready to do what needs to be done — which is to make banking boring again.

Part of the problem is that boring banking would mean poorer bankers, and the financial industry still has a lot of friends in high places. But it’s also a matter of ideology: Despite everything that has happened, most people in positions of power still associate fancy finance with economic progress.

Can they be persuaded otherwise? Will we find the will to pursue serious financial reform? If not, the current crisis won’t be a one-time event; it will be the shape of things to come.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/opinion/10krugman.html

After a modest interval with no big financial shocks, policy attention is turning to the task of preventing future crises and managing those that occur. While the deliberations will take quite a while to play out, there is some time pressure – because of the moral hazards created by the Federal Reserve’s extension of credit to investment banks and authorities’ desire to act before the sense of alarm created by recent events abates and complacency returns.

Proposals for changes in regulation and crisis response have come from many quarters, including the US Treasury and private sector groups. They offer important ideas on rearranging regulatory responsibilities – such as the Treasury’s suggestion of an enhanced role for the Federal Reserve with respect to investment banks and its call for a consumer financial regulator – and raise critical issues, such as that of procyclicality induced by regulation. They also contain a certain amount of essentially content-free calls for worthiness. So far missing from the debate has been a set of principles describing the properties of any desirable regulatory regime, against which proposals can be evaluated. Different observers will assign priority to different issues – here would be my list of six principles.

First, there should be a strong presumption against having regulators competing to supervise particular institutions or activities. Experience suggests that even when firms do not have the option of switching, there are substantial risks that regulators will be co-opted. Adding “forum shopping” exacerbates the problem.

Second, it should be recognised that to a substantial extent self-regulation is deregulation. Allowing institutions to determine capital levels based on risk models of their own design is tantamount to letting them set their own capital levels. We have seen institutions hurt again and again by events to which their models implied probabilities of less than one in a million. Where it is desired to impose capital requirements, this should be done in a way that can be monitored by supervisors on the basis of balance sheet data.

Third, regulation must be premised on the inability of institutions or their regulators to predict future market conditions with much confidence. As obvious as the subprime crisis may look in retrospect, it was not widely foreseen 18 months ago even by those worried about complacency in credit markets. As the fact that the Dow Jones index was below 6,500 when Alan Greenspan famously spoke of irrational exuberance illustrates, it is also easy to see bubbles even when assets are undervalued or properly valued, as US stocks were in 1996. Rather than judging where and when the next crisis will occur, regulators need to try to assure the resilience of the system with respect to economic shocks or problems in any one sector or institution.

Fourth, the focus of regulation must shift from the prudential practices of individual institutions to the health of the financial system. The proper focus of government regulation is not on how good a job managements do of looking out for their shareholders and bondholders. It is on the potential external consequences of their actions. This will require efforts to limit excesses when times are good and institutions appear robust – and efforts to avoid deleveraging in difficult times if that increases pressures on others. Prudence at the level of any one institution does involve more leverage at times when volatility is low than when it is high. The problem is that when any institution seeks to do what is prudent for it and sell off assets, it impairs the environment in which all others are operating and creates the kind of vicious cycle, in which liquidations beget declining prices and further liquidations, that we have just been through.

Fifth, any regulatory regime must address the risks arising from “parallel banking activities” in a realistic way. We have been reminded by recent events of the old truth that borrowing short and lending long with limited capital is always at the root of financial crisis. This type of activity is not confined to banks and their offshoots. It is practised by bond guarantors, hedge funds, mortgage institutions and some insurance companies among others. If capital requirements are raised only on one set of institutions, problems may be exacerbated as activity migrates to those that are not regulated. On the other hand, regulating all potentially highly leveraged entities is a formidable task. There is no ideal answer. But the fear is that regulation that ensures the regulated can compete fairly with the unregulated is regulation that either promises government subsidy or does not raise capital requirements much above market levels.

Sixth, regulatory policy must to the maximum extent possible create a situation in which the failure of an individual institution is not itself a source of systemic risk. Only in this way is it possible to contain the moral hazards associated with government support. The authorities had no realistic choice but to provide support as Bear Stearns faced bankruptcy. They do have a choice as to whether to put in place a regime where such problems can be managed with no government financial support provided directly or indirectly to shareholders or unsecured creditors. A resolution regime that could apply to any financial institution that became a source of systemic risk should be an urgent priority.

These principles are more easily asserted than they are reflected in an actual regulatory system. I hope to return in future columns to the question of regulatory system design.

Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e0613d4-2fef-11dd-86cc-000077b07658.html