MICROCREDIT looks like a miracle. It involves providing unsecured small loans to poor people in developing countries whom most banks would turn away. Yet these small borrowers almost always repay their loans (and the fairly steep interest charges) on time, which suggests that they find productive uses for the money. The industry’s backers make some big claims as a result: Mohammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the father of microfinance, reckons that 5% of Grameen Bank’s clients exit poverty each year. Yet economists point out that there are surprisingly few credible estimates of the extent to which microcredit actually reduces poverty.

This would not matter too much if all microfinance funding were raised via the market (as an increasing proportion is). As long as investors were satisfied with their returns, there would be no cause for concern. Yet despite growing interest from private investors, 53% of the $11.7 billion that was committed to the microfinance industry in 2008 still came at below-market rates from aid agencies, multilateral banks and other donors. Given that there are other things that aid money could be spent on, and that the rationale for subsidising microcredit is its effectiveness as an anti-poverty tool, it is important for donors to know whether it has the advertised effects.

Measuring the impact of microcredit is complicated by the fact that the counterfactual—what would have happened to a person who borrowed from a microlender if he had not done so—cannot easily be tested. Many early studies compared borrowers with non-borrowers. But if borrowers are in any case more entrepreneurial than those who do not borrow, such comparisons are likely to overstate hugely the effect of microcredit.

Worries of this nature are not mere nitpicking. One study surveyed 1,800 famil ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=471 Mon, 31 Aug 2009 18:26:51 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=471#cmt 盧峯

在美國，奧巴馬政府為了穩住市場及公眾信心，為了保持政策的穩定性，為了防禦可能捲土重來的金融風暴，決定再次任命伯南克為聯儲局主席，讓他在未來四年繼續因時制宜的維護金融體系的穩定性。

在香港，特首及特區政府一意孤行，罔顧金融風暴未完全過去的風險，堅持要抗擊金融大鱷有功，管理銀行體系及經驗最豐富的金管局總裁任志剛先生離職，換上未經考驗及未能與公眾有效溝通的陳德霖先生，令香港面對較大的風險。

兩相比較之下，那個政府的做法比較合理，比較切合時勢需要不是清楚得很嗎？

事實上全球金融體系短期內再次出現重大波動的風險是不容低估的，特別是當各主要經濟體政府及央行開始「退市」政策、開始扭轉過度寬鬆貨幣政策時風險更大。

從去年九月開始，各國央行及政府先後為金融體系注入數以萬億美元計的額外資金，先後把利率降低至接近零水平。以美國為例，聯儲局就把利息定在零至四分一厘之間；英國的利率也處於類似的低水平。其他如日本、歐元區要不是零息就是接近零息。但是，這種超低利率、極度寬鬆貨幣政策是不可能成為長期政策的，是不可能維持太久的。為了防止催生惡性通脹及扭曲經濟，各國政府肯定會在未來半年至一年內改變零息政策，讓利率重回較正常的水平，讓貨幣供應重回正軌；像澳洲這些已開始出現通脹兆頭的國家更可能在未來幾個月採取行動。

要知道金融市場回穩及再現升浪全賴特殊的救市政策，全賴幾乎不需成本的新增資金。當特殊的救市政策有改動，當「平錢」（ che ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=470 Sat, 29 Aug 2009 16:57:18 +0000 Miscellaneous http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=470#cmt Goldman Sachs's record profits owe more to lack of competition than market recovery

TO THE survivors, the spoils. That is the cry going up at Goldman Sachs after it chalked up recession-defying—nay, record-breaking—quarterly profit on Tuesday July 14th. Minting more than $3 billion in as many months, so soon after its own near-death experience in the wake of Lehman Brothers’ demise, will enhance Goldman’s reputation as Wall Street’s overachiever. But it will also strike some as faintly obscene given the scale of public support needed to keep the firm and its peers from buckling last year.

The first half of 2009 was fertile for investment bankers as markets rebounded and companies (not least banks themselves) rushed to raise debt and equity. But none of the banks still due to report, not even a resurgent JP Morgan Chase, is expected to come close to Goldman’s blow-out performance. Having incurred smaller losses than rivals, it is still prepared to deploy risk capital where others fear to tread.

Goldman claims that most of its profit came not from “proprietary” trading, or punting its own money, but by acting as a middleman, making markets for clients in everything from bonds and shares to currencies and commodities. Such “agency” business, barely profitable in the boom years, has become a potential goldmine as competition has dwindled and bid-ask spreads (the slice dealers pocket on trades) have ballooned. A bank with the capital and daring to deal mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac can earn 10-15 times more than before the crisis.

Goldman, a dyed-in-the-wool trading firm, is grabbing such opportunities with glee, taking business from once ubiquitous but now reeling rivals, such as Citigroup and UBS. It also helps that its arch-rival, Morgan Stanley, has pulled in its horns. By contrast, Goldman’s value-at-risk—the amount it could lose on a bad day ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=469 Thu, 27 Aug 2009 19:53:28 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=469#cmt

Link:  http://www.frbsf.org/education/activities/chairman/

巨無霸大賤賣

按《經濟學人》提供的資料，香港的巨無霸定價為 US$1.72（即港幣 13.42元）；同一個巨無霸，在美國索價 US$3.57，在挪威則更要 US$6.15——折合港幣 48元！美國絕大多數地方有銷售稅，歐洲則開徵「商品及服務稅」（ GST）。香港不來這一套，以完稅後的數字作比較，香港巨無霸的價錢肯定拋離外地對手更遠。

不過，香港巨無霸格外超值也不是令人詫異之處；教我難以置信的，是我們的巨無霸甚至比大陸的還便宜 3%，怎麼可能？香港的鋪租、人工都比大陸貴，香港人上深圳購物、消費——以至買? ——殆成風氣，香港哪來條件來個巨無霸大賤賣？費解也。

按《經濟學人》的說法，他們這個「巨無霸指數」（ Big Mac Index）是量度真確匯價的最佳尺度。（香港麥當勞前主席伍日照先生告訴我，是他建議《經濟學人》炮製這個指數的。）須知不管天 南地北，無論是食材、醬汁配方、重量 ——以至包上黐上多少粒芝麻——全世界的巨無霸都是一式一樣的，品質劃一跟 9999成色的黃金不遑多讓。麥當勞遍地開花，有人煙處即有一間——全球共有三萬兩千間麥當勞——那麼每處地方的巨無霸價錢不便可以精確無誤地量度出其貨幣的真確購買力了嗎？

香港的銀紙特別襟使

此話怎說？就以香港而言，在本地買巨無霸，用的當然是港元了。按《經濟學人》的資料，當下香港巨無霸的取價理應為 HK$13.42（ US$1.72× 7.8）左右。 ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=467 Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:11:00 +0000 無定向風 http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=467#cmt Investors may be too complacent about the outlook for property

TWO bear markets in the past decade have made many investors reconsider their attitude towards equities. The argument that shares are the best investment for the long run no longer sounds quite so convincing. Property is not yet the subject of such disillusionment. Already, in the British residential market at least, estate agents are talking as if the crisis is over. Many people seem to assume that once the recession has finished, property prices can resume their traditional upward course.

But if equities are doomed to struggle, property will surely follow. The terrible performance of the Japanese equity market over the past 20 years is well known. It is easy to forget that property prices have suffered almost as much. Japanese land prices are still 58.5% below their 1991 peak, and indices of residential and commercial property are 44.3% and 73% below their highs respectively.

One should expect a rough link between equities, property markets and economic growth. Neil Turner of Schroders, an asset-management group, says a simple model suggests that property returns should equal the starting yield plus rental growth. In turn, rental growth is linked to income growth and thus to nominal GDP. On the same basis, equity returns should be equivalent to dividend yield plus dividend growth, with the latter linked to GDP.

Over the past decade, however, property seems to have performed much more strongly than equities. Only in 2008 did the IPD index of global commercial property show a negative return. But the 10.1% fall (in dollar terms) was a lot better than the 40.3% plunge in the MSCI world-equities index. Over the previous decade, from 1998 to 2007, an investor who put a notional $1,000 in the IPD index would have trebled his money (assuming he reinvested his income) while an equity portfolio tracking the MSCI index would have merely ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=466 Sun, 23 Aug 2009 22:13:27 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=466#cmt Burgernomics points to uncompetitive currencies in continental Europe

Data- http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/image/big_mac_Jul_09.gif

WHEN demand is scarce and jobs are being lost, no one relishes a strong currency. A country with an uncompetitive exchange rate will struggle to sell its wares abroad and will also cede its home market to foreign firms. A weak exchange rate, by contrast, encourages consumers to switch from pricey imports to cheaper home-produced goods and services. So which countries has the foreign-exchange market blessed with a cheap currency, and which has it burdened with a dear one?

The Economist’s Big Mac index, a lighthearted guide to valuing currencies, provides some clues. It is based on the theory of purchasing-power parity (PPP), which says that exchange rates should equalise the price of a basket of goods in each country. In place of a range of products we use just one item, a Big Mac hamburger, which is sold worldwide. The exchange rate that leaves a Big Mac costing the same in dollars everywhere is our fair-value benchmark.

The dollar buys the most burger in Asia. A Big Mac costs 12.5 yuan in China, which is $1.83 at today’s exchange rate, around half its price in America. Other Asian currencies, such as the Malaysian ringgit and Thai baht, look similarly undervalued. Businesses based in continental Europe have most to be cheesed off about. The Swiss franc remains one of the world’s dearest currencies. The euro is almost 30% overvalued on the burger gauge. Denmark and Sweden look even less competitive.

Care is needed when drawing quick conclusions from fast-food prices. The cost of a burger depends heavily on local inputs, such as rent and wages, which are not easily a ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=465 Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:21:14 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=465#cmt 盧峯

要不是朋友提醒，幾乎錯過了一宗跟金融海嘯息息相關的趣聞及隨之而引發的爭論。事情是這樣的。去年十一月，英女皇為 London School of Economics（ LSE）新教學大樓揭幕，閒談間自然免不了說到剛發生的金融海嘯。據說，女皇輕輕向 LSE的教授們提出了一個問題：" Why did no one see it coming?"（點解冇人預見危機來襲？）教授們的反應如何有不同版本。有人說教授們不知所措，結結巴巴的胡謅一番；在場的教授則說自己簡單的向女皇解釋了情況，包括銀行及金融機構如何濫借，新生的金融衍生產品如何掩蓋風險等。女皇對答案是否滿意白金漢宮方面自然不會說，但英國的經濟學家、學者卻一直沒有忘記女皇的問題。今年六月一大群英國學者包括 LSE的 Tim Besley、財政部常秘 Nick MacPherson、高盛首席經濟師 Jim O'Neill……等雲集在 British Academy一個研討會上專門討論了這個問題，後來由部份學者把討論內容寫成一封三頁紙的信寄給女皇，一方面作較詳細的交代，一方面也有點致歉的意味。信件最關鍵的一段話說：「無人預見金融海嘯來襲是因為不管是本國或其他國家的聰明腦袋都未能有效把握整個金融體系的風險。」簡單來說，這群經濟學者是向女皇坦承，他們對金融體系風險一知半解以至看不到大禍臨頭。女皇沒有就「道歉信」作反應，但信件內容經傳媒在上月底公開後立時引發大量有趣的議論。有的人為經濟學者解畫，指出其實有小部份人如克魯明、羅賓尼幾年前已預警樓市泡沫將會爆破，只是無法預見牽連如此深、如此廣而已。也有學者如為凱恩斯寫了三大冊傳記的 Robert Skidelsky（ Lord Skidelsky）認為經濟學主流學說在金融海嘯中顯得蒼白無力，既未能預見問題，又不能有效� ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=464 Wed, 19 Aug 2009 16:39:10 +0000 Miscellaneous http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=464#cmt Are investment banks run for employees or shareholders?

IT WAS once famously asked of Wall Street: “Where are the customers’ yachts?” Shareholders of investment banks have not seen much of the spoils either, given the events of the past two years. As business booms once more, rather than reward their owners with an extra big chunk of profits, most investment banks seem likely to favour their employees again. In the case of Goldman Sachs, shareholders received $4.4 billion of profits during the first half of this year while staff were allocated $11.4 billion in pay and bonuses, equivalent to about half of the firm’s net revenues.

Banks defend their model by arguing that they have to pay top dollar to secure the best employees, who maximise profits for shareholders. If they paid less, profits would be lower. For Goldman there may be some truth in this. In the first half of 2009 shareholders still earned a healthy return on equity of 19%. And over the decade to the end of 2008, even though cumulative compensation was double profits, return on equity averaged 20%. Furthermore, since a chunk of bonuses are paid in stock and staff cannot sell their shares immediately, their interests are to some extent aligned with those of shareholders.

There are several holes in the industry’s argument, however. One is that when investment bankers owned the banks themselves, partners demanded higher returns on their equity than public shareholders now get. In the three years before the bank floated in 1999, Goldman partners earned returns on their capital of about 50% each year.

More importantly, the industry-wide practice of paying out about half of net revenues to employees looks a lot less palatable for shareholders once mediocre or bad banks are taken into account. This is a risky industry: two of America’s five big stand-alone investment banks collapsed during the crisis. And when things go wrong employees do n ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=463 Sun, 16 Aug 2009 18:37:26 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=463#cmt Accounting rules for financial firms are a mess. New proposals go some way to cleaning them up

FOR the past two years accounting has been engulfed in a religious war. On one side are those who want loans, securities and other financial assets to be carried at market prices. On the other are managers, backed by many politicians and regulators, who would prefer assets to be carried at cost and written down only when they say losses are likely.

There are problems with both approaches. Fans of “marking to market” are accused of being zealots who forced banks and insurance firms to book exaggerated losses as prices fell, in turn pushing them into insolvency and sending the financial system spiralling towards hell. Those in the second camp, meanwhile, are accused of cooking the books before the crisis, and then bullying standards-setters to ease the rules once the scale of bad debts became clear. To make matters worse, a long series of fudges means firms’ balance-sheets use a mix of both approaches. Different firms may hold identical assets at different prices, and recognise losses on them in several ways.

Into the mayhem has stepped the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which sets the rules in most of Europe and Asia and is eventually expected to have authority in America, too. Beaten up by furious politicians, and urged by investors to fight back, it has drafted new rules that should apply from the end of this year. The result is still a fudge, but a superior sort of fudge. With some tweaks it should deliver what both sides want: accounting that does not exacerbate the economic cycle, but which still allows investors to compare assets’ market prices with managers’ version of events.

Under the new proposals, there would be only two asset categories. Loans, and simple debt securities that are similar to loans, would be valued at their cost, provided banks can show they are being held for t ..]]> http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=462 Sat, 15 Aug 2009 15:05:53 +0000 The Economist http://ronaldecon.blogsite.org/index.php?id=462#cmt